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Discovery of Defendant's Financial
Condition in Cases Claiming
Punitive Damages
by Robert L. Ferguson, Esq.
Jodi K Ebersole, Esq.
I. Introduction
In recent years the number of cases
which include a claim for punitive damages has increased. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland has enlarged the scope of
cases in which punitive damages may be
recovered to include those negligence
cases where there is evidence that the
defendant was driving while intoxicated
or where the defendant's negligent conduct was wanton or exhibited a reckless
disregard for human life. I The facts upon
which the claim for punitive damages is
based are often hotly disputed. In some
cases the allegations of fact and the
claim for punitive damages are not well
founded, but are asserted primarily to
improve the plaintiffs bargaining
position.
Ordinarily, information concerning a
defendant'S financial condition is discoverable only after judgment and in aid
of execution. 2 In cases where punitive
damages are justified, the trier of fact
may consider evidence of the defendant's financial worth when determining the amount of such damages. Some
procedural safeguards are necessary
when punitive damages are claimed in
order to balance the access to a defendant's financial· information against protecting the defendant from harassment.
Such safeguards are also necessary to
protect the defendant when the plaintiff
cannot establish the right to recover
punitive damages. Safeguards are particularly important now that the right to
recover punitive damages in some cases
is subject to constitutional challenge. 3
This issue does not appear to have
been litigated recently in any reported
Maryland decisions. Although it is clear
that the financial condition of a defendant is relevant in cases where punitive
damages are alleged, Maryland law pro-

vides that such evidence is not admissible until after a defendant is found liable
and punitive damages are found to be
warranted. 4 Because it is first necessary
for a plaintiff to prove a primaJacie case
for punitive damages before being allowed to introduce evidence of a defendant's financial condition, it is probable that the Maryland courts will follow
the same protective route in controlling
the timing of discovery of net worth.
In Maryland, any matter not privileged
is discoverable if relevant to the determination of the case or if reasonably
calculated to lead to evidence admissible at trial. 5 Evidence of a defendant's
financial condition, or net worth, is
admissible at trial when considering
punitive damages. Therefore, financial
information falls within the scope of
relevance where punitive damages are
legitimately at issue in a case. 6
This does not mean, however, that a
defendant's financial condition may be
open to discovery from the onset of the
case by a mere allegation of the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages.
Since the adoption of the new Maryland
Rules in 1984, there have been no
reported Maryland cases dealing with
the issue of exactly when the financial
condition of a defendant may be discovered. However, the issue has been
discussed by commentators and courts
in other jurisdictions, with varying conclusions and results.
The jurisdictions which have ruled on
this issue and which permit the trier of
fact to consider the financial condition
of the defendant in making an award of
punitive damages fall into three categories following the three leading cases in
this area. The first category involves the
liberal "factual allegation" rule. In Coy v.
Superior Court,7 a California appellate

court considered the issue of whether
pretrial discovery of a defendant's wealth
was permitted. The trial court ruled that
the plaintiff must wait until after he
obtained a judgment in order to discover such information. In reversing the
trial court, the appellate court held that
because the plaintiff sought punitive
damages, the defendant'S financial information was relevant and, therefore,
properly discoverable. The court reasoned that because this evidence is
admissible at trial for the purpose of
determining the proper amount of punitive damages, the defendant must disclose the information in pretrial discovery. Other states which follow this liberal
rule of discovery include Hawaii8 and
Tennessee. 9
Since 1981, however, California appears to have become more conservative in this area. In 1981, the California
legislature adopted § 3295( c) of the
California Civil Code in an apparent
effort to provide some procedural safeguards for this liberal financial discovery
rule. This law now requires the plaintiff
to first obtain an order from the court
authorizing the disclosure. The court
may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing
on the matter. Upon a finding that there
is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the punitive damages
claim, an order may be entered permitting discovery of the defendant's financial status. 10
The second category of states follows
a moderate rule which requires more
than a mere allegation that a plaintiff is
entitled to punitive damages before an
order for discovery of the defendant's
financial condition may be granted. This
rule was enunciated in a New Jersey
case, Gierman v. Toman, II where the
court determined that the financial con-
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dition of a defendant, although relevant
in a case involving punitive damages,
deserved some protection. Therefore,
the court held that a plaintiff's right to
discover a defendant's net worth was
conditioned upon prima facie proof
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
punitive damages. This rule is also followed in Colorado l2 and Wyoming. 13
The third approach involves the more
conservative rule of discovery enunciated by the New York Court of Appeals
in Rupert v. Sellers. 14 The court reviewed
and specifically rejected the above two
rules proposed by the California and
New Jersey courts, ruling that a plaintiff
must first obtain a special verdict finding
him entitled to punitive damages. After
obtaining this verdict, it is then possible
for the plaintiff to discover information
regarding the defendant's financial
status.
It is currently unclear which, if any, of
the above three rules adopted by other
jurisdictions will be followed by Maryland courts. In two cases decided by trial
courts prior to the enactment of the
revised Maryland Rules, the courts refused to allow the plaintiffs to obtain
pretrial discovery from the defendant
regarding his financial status prior to
obtaining a judgment. In the first case,
Whiteley v. Lockner, 15 the court ruled
on whether a defendant was required to
answer interrogatories of a plaintiff suing
to recover money allegedly loaned to
the defendant. In pretrial interrogatories,
the plaintiff requested information regarding the financial condition of the
defendant which the defendant refused
to answer. The court held that these
interrogatories were premature and
might be proper if and when the plaintiff
obtains a judgment. 16 While this case is
not directly on point, it shows the
court's tendency to prevent the disclosure of a defendant's financial status
before the plaintiff proves his entitlement to such information.
The second case, Miller v. Crook,17 is
directly on point because the plaintiff
actually made a claim for punitive damages. In Miller, the plaintiff attempted to
obtain information regarding the defendant's financial condition through pretrial discovery. The court held that unless
there is a specific showing of good cause
why a defendant must disclose his financial affairs in advance of trial, the issue of
~~e
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defendant's financial condition is considered severable from the issue of liability, and pretrial discovery of such
information is not permitted. However,
the court ordered the defendant to prepare the information requested and to
have it available at trial to submit to the
jury after a determination of the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive
damages. IS
There does not appear to be any other
reported decisions regarding this matter in Maryland. Despite this lack of
authority, it has been written that Maryland courts have traditionally controlled
the timing of the discovery of net worth
and required its production only after
demonstration by the plaintiff of aprima
facie case for punitive damages. 19 Before
such a showing, the defendant may
properly refuse production of net worth
data. 20

[TJ he outrage . . . is
that a defendant's
financial condition,
while relevant, . . . is
highly confidential
and personal. "
ff

II. Public Policy Considerations

The major consideration motivating
the outrage and debate by courts and
commentators alike is that a defendant's
financial condition, while relevant to a
determination of the amount of an award
for punitive damages, is highly confidential and personal. The divulging of such
information, while a great incentive for
effectuating settlements, may actually
coerce a defendant to settle unmeritorious claims. This concern was discussed
in Miller v. Crook21 where the court
stated the following:
[indiscriminate discovery] could
bring about irreparable and unjust
harm to litigants. A person with an
unfounded claim could seriously
embarrass another. A man could
ruin a business competitor by alleging a case for punitive damages,
discover his opponent's business
secrets and then dismiss the suit.

The discovery rules could of themselves become an instrument of
malice. 22
An article discussing the discovery
and admissibility of a defendant'S financial condition addressed the public policy reasons why a rule allowing unfettered, pre-trial access to such financial
information is injudicious, stating the
following:
[T]he vexations aspect of this freewheeling discovery is two-fold.
First, there is a concern that every
case will be pled as a punitive
damage case in order to engage in
pre-judgment asset discovery and
to apply settlement pressure.
Second, there is a concern for legitimate privacy and proprietary interests which might be unduly
compromised. 23
If the Maryland courts adopted a rule
making such discovery immediately available upon a factual allegation supporting punitive damages, defendants would
be "essentially defenseless against the
pretrial discovery motions of a plaintiff
in cases where the alleged conduct
could support punitive damages."24
California, one of the first states to
adopt the "factual allegation" rule, made
the following observations after two
decades of that rule's use:
It soon became obvious . . . that
such discovery had enhanced
rather than removed the 'game
element' by creating a situation in
which a plaintiff, merely by alleging a claim for punitive damages,
could pressure a defendant into a
settlement because of a desire to
protect his financial privacy.25
Another court cautioned:
If plaintiffs were allowed unlimited discovery of defendants' financial resources in cases where
there is no actual factual basis for
an award of punitive damages, the
personal and private financial affairs of defendants would be unnecessarily exposed and, in some
cases, the threat of such exposure
might be used by unscrupulous
plaintiffs to coerce settlements
from innocent defendants. 26
As can be seen from these cases, a
defendant's right to privacy is held to
rank higher on a societal hierarchy of
values than a plaintiff's discovery needs. 27

Therefore, there must be some sort of
protective measures in place to protect
such a vital interest.
Courts in states following the "factual
allegation" rule have begun relying upon
protective orders as a means for relief
for defendants. As a Tennessee court
noted, "a protective order can be fashioned which protects defendants' legitimate privacy rights while preserving the
discovery rights of plaintiffs."28 The
problem with protective orders is that
they merely prevent public disclosure of
this private information. Forcing a defendant to disclose personal financial infor!!1ation to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs
attorney may coerce a defendant to settle the case rather than comply with a
discovery order. 29
To require the pretrial disclosure
of a defendant's assets to the plaintiff, even as an aid to settlement
and subject to a protective order
against disclosure to others, would
be a serious invasion of privacy.
The threat of having to place a dollar value on one's assets and to
disclose that valuation to strangers
may well serve as a powerful weapon to coerce a settlement which is
not warranted by the facts of the
case. 30
Other commentators agree that complete "unfettered access" to a defendant's financial net worth by a simple
allegation of entitlement to punitive
damages would cause unreasonable harassment and irreparable harm to a defendant's right to privacy. One author
argues that the question of discovery of a
defendant's net worth should not be
resolved until after the conclusion of
discovery on the merits. 31 After this
conclusion, the plaintiff must prove a
prima fade case of a triable issue on the
defendant's liability for punitive damages in a "mini-trial" before such discovery is allowed. This technique properly balances the defendant's interest in
privacy, the plaintiffs need to discover
relevant information in time to either
settle the case or prepare for trial and
the interest in judicial economy.32
Another suggestion is that a defendant would be required to file with the
court a form containing net worth information by the date the trial commences. 33 The information would remain
sealed until the jury rendered a special

verdict of liability for punitive damages.
At that time, a recess would be called in
order to allow the plaintiff the oppor·
tunity to inspect and challenge the net
worth representation. The trial could
then resume with the presentation of
net worth evidence. 34
III. Conclusion
It is premature to conclude that Maryland courts will adopt the New York
rule requiring the plaintiff to first receive
a special verdict on liability and a finding
that plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages before he may discover information
regarding the defendant's financial status. It is clear, however, that there is a
tendency in Maryland, prior to the enactment of section 1O-913( c) of Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article and the current Maryland discovery rules, to protect the defendant

Ult is more probable
that the Maryland
courts will require the
plaintiff to show a
prima facie case for
punitive damages
before discovery of the
defendant's financial
status is permitted."
from unreasonable intrusion and harassment by limiting the availability of
discovery of a defendant'S financial status prior to the point where it is shown
that the plaintiff is entitled to such
information.
It is more probable that the Maryland
courts will require the plaintiff to show
a prima fade case for punitive damages
before discovery of the defendant'S financial status is permitted. As indicated
above, there are strong public policy
reasons for a procedure requiring that
financial information be disclosed only

after the plaintiff has proved a prima
fade case at trial or in a separate hearing. These same considerations also support a procedure which mandates such
information remain sealed until after the
trier of fact has determined that punitive
damages should be awarded or the
plaintiff has satisfied the court that a
prima fade case exists.
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